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Abstract—The detection of software vulnerabilities (or vulner-
abilities for short) is an important problem that has yet to be
tackled, as manifested by many vulnerabilities reported on a
daily basis. This calls for machine learning methods to auto-
mate vulnerability detection. Deep learning is attractive for this
purpose because it does not require human experts to manually
define features. Despite the tremendous success of deep learning
in other domains, its applicability to vulnerability detection is
not systematically understood. In order to fill this void, we
propose the first systematic framework for using deep learning
to detect vulnerabilities. The framework, dubbed Syntax-based,
Semantics-based, and Vector Representations (SySeVR), focuses
on obtaining program representations that can accommodate
syntax and semantic information pertinent to vulnerabilities. Our
experiments with 4 software products demonstrate the usefulness
of the framework: we detect 15 vulnerabilities that are not
reported in the National Vulnerability Database. Among these
15 vulnerabilities, 7 are unknown and have been reported to the
vendors, and the other 8 have been “silently” patched by the
vendors when releasing newer versions of the products.
Index Terms—Vulnerability detection, security, deep learning,
program analysis, program representation.
I. INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE vulnerabilities (or vulnerabilities for short) area fundamental reason for the prevalence of cyber attacks.
Despite academic and industrial efforts at improving software
quality, vulnerabilities remain a big problem. This can be
justified by the fact that each year, many vulnerabilities are
reported in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
[1].
Given that vulnerabilities are inevitable, it is important to
detect them as early as possible. Source code-based static
analysis is an important approach to detecting vulnerabilities,
including code similarity-based methods [2], [3] and pattern-
based methods [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. Code similarity-
based methods can detect vulnerabilities that are incurred by
code cloning, but have high false-negatives when vulnera-
bilities are not caused by code cloning [11]. Pattern-based
methods may require human experts to define vulnerability
features for representing vulnerabilities, which makes them
error-prone and laborious. Therefore, an ideal method should
Corresponding author: Deqing Zou.
Z. Li, D. Zou, H. Jin, Y. Zhu, and Z. Chen are with the Services
Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab,
Big Data Security Engineering Research Center, School of Computer Sci-
ence and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology,
Wuhan 430074, China (e-mail: {lizhen hust, deqingzou, hjin, yokisir, zhaox-
aunchen}@hust.edu.cn).
S. Xu is with the Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at
San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA (e-mail: shxu@cs.utsa.edu).
be able to detect vulnerabilities caused by a wide range of
reasons while imposing as little reliance on human experts as
possible.
Deep learning — including Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNN) [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) [17], [18], and Deep Belief Networks (DBN)
[19], [20] — has been successful in image and natural lan-
guage processing. While it is tempting to use deep learning to
detect vulnerabilities, we observe that there is a “domain gap”:
deep learning is born to cope with data with natural vector
representations (e.g., pixels of images); in contrast, software
programs do not have such vector representations. Recently,
we proposed the first deep learning-based vulnerability detec-
tion system VulDeePecker [11] with the capability of pinning
down the locations of vulnerabilities. While demonstrating
the feasibility of using deep learning to detect vulnerabilities,
VulDeePecker has a range of weaknesses: (i) It considers only
the vulnerabilities that are related to library/API function calls.
(ii) It leverages only the semantic information induced by data
dependency. (iii) It considers only the particular RNN known
as Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BLSTM). (iv) It
makes no effort to explain the cause of false-positives and
false-negatives.
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose the first sys-
tematic framework for using deep learning to detect vulner-
abilities. The framework is centered at answering the fol-
lowing question: How can we represent programs as vectors
that accommodate syntax and semantic information that is
suitable for vulnerability detection? In order to answer this
question, we introduce and define the notions of Syntax-
based Vulnerability Candidates (SyVCs) and Semantics-based
Vulnerability Candidates (SeVCs), and design algorithms for
computing them. Intuitively, SyVCs reflect vulnerability syn-
tax characteristics, and SeVCs extend SyVCs to accommodate
the semantic information induced by data dependency and
control dependency. Correspondingly, the framework is called
Syntax-based, Semantics-based, and Vector Representations,
or SySeVR for short. As a piggyback, this study overcomes
the aforementioned weaknesses (i)-(iv) of [11].
In order to evaluate SySeVR, we produce a dataset of 126
types of vulnerabilities caused by various reasons from the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21] and the Software
Assurance Reference Dataset (SARD) [22], while noting that
the dataset published by [11] is not sufficient for our purpose
because it contains only 2 types of vulnerabilities. Our dataset
is of independent value, and has been made publicly available
at https://github.com/SySeVR/SySeVR.
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2Equipped with the new dataset, we show that SySeVR can
make deep learning detect vulnerabilities. Some findings are:
(1) SySeVR can make multiple kinds of deep neural networks
detect various kinds of vulnerabilities. SySeVR makes Bidirec-
tional RNNs, especially the Bidirectional Gated Recurrent Unit
(BGRU), more effective than CNNs, and makes CNNs more
effective than DBNs. Moreover, SySeVR renders deep neural
networks (especially BGRU) much more effective than the
state-of-the-art vulnerability detection methods. (2) In terms
of explaining the cause of false-positives and false-negatives,
we find that the effectiveness of BGRU is substantially af-
fected by the training data. If some syntax elements (e.g.,
tokens) often appear in vulnerable (vs. not vulnerable) pieces
of code, then these syntax elements may cause high false-
positives (correspondingly, false-negatives). (3) It is better to
use deep neural networks that are tailored to specific kind of
vulnerabilities than to use a single deep neural network to
detect various kinds of vulnerabilities. (4) The more semantic
information accommodated for learning deep neural networks,
the higher vulnerability detection capability the learned neural
networks. For example, semantic information induced by con-
trol dependency can reduce the false-negative rate by 19.6%
on average. (5) By applying SySeVR-enabled BGRU to 4
software products (Libav, Seamonkey, Thunderbird, and Xen),
we detect 15 vulnerabilities that have not been reported in
NVD [21]. Among these 15 vulnerabilities, 7 are unknown
to exist in these software despite that similar vulnerabilities
are known to exist in other software); for ethical reasons, we
do not release their precise locations, but we have reported
them to the respective vendors. The other 8 vulnerabilities
have been “silently” patched by the vendors when releasing
newer versions of the products.
Paper outline. Section II presents the SySeVR framework.
Section III describes experiments and results. Section IV
discusses limitations of the present study. Section V reviews
related prior work. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. THE SYSEVR FRAMEWORK
A. The Domain Gap
Deep learning is successful in the domain of image pro-
cessing and other applications, which is however different
from the domain of vulnerability detection. In order to clearly
see the gap between these domains (i.e., the “domain gap”),
let us consider the example of using deep learning to detect
human in an image. As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), this can be
achieved by using the notion of region proposal [23], [24] and
leveraging the structural representation of images (e.g., texture,
edge, and color). Multiple region proposals can be extracted
from one image, and each region proposal can be treated as
a “unit” for training neural networks to detect objects (i.e.,
human in this example). When using deep learning to detect
vulnerabilities, there is no natural structural representation for
programs like what region proposal is to images. This means
that deep learning cannot be directly used for vulnerability
detection.
B. The Framework
Overview. In order to bridge the domain gap, one may suggest
treating each function in a program as a region proposal in
image processing. However, this is too coarse-grained because
vulnerability detectors not only need to tell whether a function
is vulnerable or not, but also need to pin down the locations of
vulnerabilities. That is, we need finer-grained representation of
programs for vulnerability detection. On the other hand, one
may suggest treating each line of code (i.e., statement — the
two terms are used interchangeably in this paper) as a unit for
vulnerability detection. This treatment has two drawbacks: (i)
most statements in a program do not contain any vulnerability,
meaning that few samples are vulnerable; and (ii) multiple
statements that are semantically related to each other are not
considered as a whole.
Inspired by the notion of region proposal in image process-
ing, we propose dividing a program into smaller pieces of code
(i.e., a number of statements), which may exhibit the syntax
and semantics characteristics of vulnerabilities. This explains,
as highlighted in Fig. 1(b), why the framework seeks SyVC,
SeVC, and vector representations of programs.
Running example. In order to help understand the details
of SySeVR, we use Fig. 2 to highlight how SySeVR extracts
SyVCs, SeVCs, and vector representation of SeVCs. At a high
level, a SyVC, highlighted by a box in Fig. 2, is a code element
that may or may not be vulnerable according to some syntax
characteristics of known vulnerabilities. A SeVC extends a
SyVC to include statements (i.e., lines of code) that are
semantically related to the SyVC, where semantic information
is induced by control dependency and/or data dependency; this
SyVC→SeVC transformation is fairly involved and therefore
elaborated in Fig. 3. Each SeVC is encoded into a vector for
input to deep neural networks.
1) Extracting SyVCs: We observe that most vulnerabilities
exhibit some simple syntax characteristics, such as function
call and pointer usage. Therefore, we propose using syntax
characteristics to identify SyVCs, which serve as a starting
point (i.e., SyVCs are not sufficient for training deep learning
models because they accommodate no semantic information
of vulnerabilities). In order to define SyVC, we first define:
Definition 1 (program, function, statement, token): A pro-
gram P is a set of functions f1, . . . , fη , denoted by P =
{f1, . . . , fη}. A function fi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ η, is an
ordered set of statements si,1, . . . , si,mi , denoted by fi =
{si,1, . . . , si,mi}. A statement si,j , where 1 ≤ i ≤ η and
1 ≤ j ≤ mi, is an ordered set of tokens ti,j,1, . . . , ti,j,wi,j ,
denoted by si,j = {ti,j,1, . . . , ti,j,wi,j}. Note that tokens can
be identifiers, operators, constants, and keywords, and can be
extracted by lexical analysis.
Defining SyVCs. Given a function fi, there are standard rou-
tines for generating its abstract syntax tree, which is denoted
by Ti. On Ti, the root corresponds to function fi, a leaf node
corresponds to a token ti,j,g (1 ≤ g ≤ wi,j), and an internal
node corresponds to a statement si,j or multiple consecutive
tokens of si,j . Intuitively, a SyVC is one token (corresponding
to a leaf node) or consists of multiple consecutive tokens
(corresponding to an internal node). Formally,
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(a) Deep learning for image processing (object detection)
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Fig. 1. (a) The notion of region proposal in image processing. (b) The SySeVR framework inspired by the notion of region proposal and
centered at obtaining SyVC, SeVC, and vector representations of programs.
Program source code SyVCs (highlighted by boxes)
Vector representation of the 
example SeVC
7    void func()
9    char *data ; 
10  char dataBuffer[100]; 
11  char source[100]; 
13  memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 99); 
14  dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
16  while (1)
18  data = dataBuffer  - 8;
22  memset(source, 'C', 99); 
23  source[99] = '\0'; 
24  memmove (data, source, 
      100*sizeof(char)); 
25  data[99] = '\0'; 
26  printLine(data); 
1    void printLine(const  char * line)
3    if(line != NULL) 
4    printf("%s\n", line);
1  void printLine(const  char * line)
2  {
3      if(line != NULL) 
4           printf("%s\n", line);
5   }
6
7  void func()
8  {
9     char *data;
10   char dataBuffer[100];
11   char source[100];
12   .. .
13   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 99);
14   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
15   .. .
16   while(1)
17   {
18        data = dataBuffer  - 8;
19        break;
20    }
21   .. .
22   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
23   source[99] = '\0'; 
24   memmove(data, source, 
       100*sizeof(char));
25   data[99] = '\0';
26   printLine(data);
27 }
SeVC representation: this 
example of SeVC corresponds 
to the SyVC “data” (line 25) 
and accommodates the other 
statements (i.e., lines of code) 
that are semantically related to 
the SyVC. This SyVCSeVC 
transformation is further 
elaborated in Figure 3.
1  void printLine(const  char * line)
2  {
3      if(line != NULL) 
4           printf("%s\n", line);
5   }
6
7  void func()
8  {
9     char  *data;
10   char dataBuffer[100];
11   char source[100];
12   .. .
13   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 99);
14   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
15   .. .
16   while(1)
17   {
18        data = dataBuffer  - 8;
19        break;
20    }
21   .. .
22   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
23   source[99] = '\0'; 
24   memmove(data, source, 
       100*sizeof(char));
25   data[99] = '\0';
26   printLine(data);
27 }
[array([1.2127248, 0.09549687, 
-0.05936106, -0.115688 , 
-0.16013387, .. .], dtype=float32), 
array([1.01583385, -0.46685755, 
-0.23064175, 0.54472417, 
0.16240177, .. .], dtype=float32), 
array([1.01583385, -0.46685755, 
-0.23064175, 0.54472417, 
0.16240177, .. .], dtype=float32),
array([-0.19560172, -0.49783102, 
1.01025033, 0.1692847, 
-0.65818149, .. .], dtype=float32),
 .. ., 
 .. ., 
array([1.08994234, -0.19623509, 
-0.11468308, 0.11434121, 
-0.14202058, .. .], dtype=float32)]
Fig. 2. An example illustrating SyVC, SeVC, and vector representations of program, where SyVCs are highlighted by boxes and one SyVC
may be part of another SyVC. The SyVC→SeVC transformation is elaborated in Fig. 3.
Definition 2 (SyVC): Consider a program P = {f1, . . ., fη},
where fi = {si,1, . . . , si,mi} with si,j = {ti,j,1, . . ., ti,j,wi,j}.
Given a set of vulnerability syntax characteristics, denoted by
H = {hk}1≤k≤β where β is the number of syntax character-
istics, a code element ei,j,z is composed of one or multiple
consecutive tokens of si,j , namely ei,j,z = (ti,j,u, . . . , ti,j,v)
where 1 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ wi,j . A code element ei,j,z is called
a SyVC if it matches some vulnerability syntax characteristic
hk.
Note that different kinds of vulnerabilities would have
different syntax characteristics. For example, vulnerabilities
related to library/API function calls have the following syntax
characteristic: a function on Ti is a “callee” (indicating a
function call). In Section III, we will show how to extract
vulnerability syntax characteristics and determine whether a
code element matches a syntax characteristic or not.
Algorithm for computing SyVCs. Given a program P =
{f1, . . . , fη} and a set H = {hk}1≤k≤β of vulnerability
syntax characteristics, Algorithm 1 extracts SyVCs from P
as follows. First, Algorithm 1 uses a standard routine to
Algorithm 1 Extracting SyVCs from a program
Input: A program P = {f1, . . . , fη}; a set H = {hk}1≤k≤β of
vulnerability syntax characteristics
Output: A set Y of SyVCs
1: Y ← ∅;
2: for each function fi ∈ P do
3: Generate an abstract syntax tree Ti for fi;
4: for each code element ei,j,z in Ti do
5: for each hk ∈ H do
6: if ei,j,z matches hk then
7: Y ← Y ∪ {ei,j,z};
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: return Y ; {the set of SyVCs}
generate an abstract syntax tree Ti for each function fi. Then,
Algorithm 1 traverses Ti to identify SyVCs, namely the code
elements that match some hk. We defer the details to Section
III-B1, because different vulnerability syntax characteristics
need different matching methods.
4Running example. In the second column of Fig. 2, we
use boxes to highlight all of the SyVCs that are extracted
from the program source code using the vulnerability syntax
characteristics that will be described in Section III-B1. We
will elaborate how these SyVCs are extracted. It is worth
mentioning that one SyVC may be part of another SyVC.
For example, there are three SyVCs that are extracted from
line 18 because they are extracted with respect to different
vulnerability syntax characteristics.
2) Transforming SyVCs to SeVCs: In order to detect vul-
nerabilities, we propose transforming SyVCs to SeVCs, or
SyVC→SeVC transformation, to accommodate the statements
that are semantically related to the SyVCs in question. For this
purpose, we propose leveraging the program slicing technique
to identify the statements that are semantically related to
SyVCs. In order to use the program slicing technique, we need
to use Program Dependency Graph (PDG). This requires us
to use data dependency and control dependency, which are
defined over Control Flow Graph (CFG). These concepts are
reviewed below.
Definition 3 (CFG [25]): For a program P = {f1, . . ., fη},
the CFG of function fi is a graph Gi = (Vi, Ei), where Vi =
{ni,1, . . . , ni,ci} is a set of nodes with each node representing
a statement or control predicate, and Ei = {i,1, . . ., i,di} is
a set of direct edges with each edge representing the possible
flow of control between a pair of nodes.
Definition 4 (data dependency [25]): Consider a program
P = {f1, . . . , fη}, the CFG Gi = (Vi, Ei) of function fi,
and two nodes ni,j and ni,` in Gi where 1 ≤ j, ` ≤ ci and
j 6= `. If a value computed at ni,` is used at ni,j , then ni,j is
data-dependent on ni,`.
Definition 5 (control dependency [25]): Consider a program
P = {f1, . . . , fη}, the CFG Gi = (Vi, Ei) of function fi, and
two nodes ni,j and ni,` in Gi where 1 ≤ j, ` ≤ ci and j 6= `.
It is said that ni,j post-dominates ni,` if all paths from ni,` to
the end of the program traverse through ni,j . If there exists a
path starting at ni,` and ending at ni,j such that (i) ni,j post-
dominates every node on the path excluding ni,` and ni,j ,
and (ii) ni,j does not post-dominate ni,`, then ni,j is control-
dependent on ni,`.
Based on data dependency and control dependency, we can
define PDG.
Definition 6 (PDG [25]): For a program P = {f1, . . ., fη},
the PDG of function fi is denoted by G′i = (Vi, E
′
i), where Vi
is the same as in CFG Gi, and E′i = {′i,1, . . ., ′i,d′i} is a set
of direct edges with each edge representing a data or control
dependency between a pair of nodes.
Given PDGs, we can extract the program slices of SyVCs,
which may go beyond the boundaries of individual functions.
We consider both forward and backward slices because (i) the
SyVC may affect some subsequential statements, which may
therefore contain a vulnerability; and (ii) the statements af-
fecting the SyVC may render the SyVC vulnerable. Formally,
Definition 7 (forward, backward, and program slices of a
SyVC): Consider a program P = {f1, . . . , fη}, PDGs G′i =
(Vi, E
′
i) of functions fi, and a SyVC, ei,j,z , of statement si,j
in G′i.
• The forward slice of SyVC ei,j,z in fi, denoted by fsi,j,z ,
is defined as an ordered set of nodes {ni,x1 , . . ., ni,xµi} ⊆
Vi in G′i, where ni,xp , 1 ≤ x1 ≤ xp ≤ xµi ≤ ci, is
reachable from ei,j,z in G′i. That is, the nodes in fsi,j are
from all paths in G′i starting at ei,j,z .
• The interprocedural forward slice of SyVC ei,j,z in
program P , denoted by fs′i,j,z , is a forward slice going
beyond function boundaries (caused by function calls).
• The backward slice of SyVC ei,j,z in fi, denoted by
bsi,j,z , is defined as an ordered set of nodes {ni,y1 , . . . ,
ni,yνi} ⊆ Vi in G′i, where ni,yp , 1 ≤ y1 ≤ yp ≤ yνi ≤ ci,
from which ei,j,z is reachable in G′i. That is, the nodes
in bsi,j,z are from all paths in G′i ending at ei,j,z .
• The interprocedural backward slice of SyVC ei,j,z in
program P , denoted by bs′i,j,z , is a backward slice going
beyond function boundaries (caused by function calls).
• Given an interprocedural forward slice fs′i,j,z and an
interprocedural backward slice bs′i,j,z , the (interprocedu-
ral) program slice of SyVC ei,j,z , denoted by psi,j,z , is
defined as an ordered set of nodes (belonging to the PDGs
of functions in P ) by merging fs′i,j,z and bs
′
i,j,z at the
SyVC ei,j,z .
Defining SeVCs. Having extracted the program slices of
SyVCs, we can transform them to SeVCs according to:
Definition 8 (SeVC): Given a program P = {f1, . . . , fη}
and a SyVC ei,j,z in statement si,j of function fi, the
SeVC corresponding to SyVC ei,j,z , denoted by δi,j,z , is
defined as an ordered subset of statements in P , denoted
by δi,j,z = {sa1,b1 , . . . , saui,j,z ,bvi,j,z }, where a data depen-
dency or control dependency exists between statement sap,bq
(1 ≤ p ≤ ui,j,z and 1 ≤ q ≤ vi,j,z) and SyVC ei,j,z . In
other words, a SeVC, δi,j,z , is an ordered set of statments
that correspond to the nodes of (interprocedural) program slice
psi,j,z .
Algorithm for computing SeVCs and running examples.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the preceding discussion in three
steps: generating PDGs; generating program slices of the
SyVCs output by Algorithm 1; and transforming program
slices to SeVCs. In what follows we elaborate these steps
and using Fig. 3 to illustrate a running example. Specifically,
Fig. 3 elaborates the SyVC→SeVC transformation of SyVC
“data” (related to pointer usage) while accommodating se-
mantic information induced by data dependency and control
dependency.
Step 1 (lines 2-4 in Algorithm 2). This step generates a
PDG for each function. For this purpose, there are standard
algorithms (e.g., [26]). As a running example, the second col-
umn of Fig. 3 shows the PDGs respectively corresponding to
functions func and printLine, where each number represents
the line number of a statement.
Step 2: (lines 6-9 in Algorithm 2). This step generates the
program slice psi,j,z for each SyVC ei,j,z . The interprocedural
forward slice fs′i,j,z is obtained by merging fsi,j,z and the
forward slices from the functions called by fi. The interproce-
dural backward slice bs′i,j,z is obtained by merging bsi,j,z and
the backward slices from both the functions called by fi and
the functions calling fi. Finally, fs′i,j,z and bs
′
i,j,z are merged
into a program slice psi,j,z .
5Program source code Step 1: generating PDGs of functions; examples 
are PDGs of functions func() and printLine()
Step 3: transforming program slices to 
SeVCs; example is for SyVC “data”
7    void func()
9    char *data ; 
10  char dataBuffer[100]; 
11  char source[100]; 
13  memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 99); 
14  dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
16  while (1)
18  data = dataBuffer - 8;
22  memset(source, 'C', 99); 
23  source[99] = '\0'; 
24  memmove (data, source, 
      100*sizeof(char)); 
25  data[99] = '\0'; 
26  printLine(data); 
1    void printLine(const char * line)
3    if(line != NULL) 
4    printf("%s\n", line);
1  void printLine(const char * line)
2  {
3      if(line != NULL) 
4           printf("%s\n", line);
5   }
6
7  void func()
8  {
9     char *data;
10   char dataBuffer[100];
11   char source[100];
12   ...
13   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 99);
14   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
15   ...
16   while(1)
17   {
18        data = dataBuffer - 8;
19        break;
20    }
21   ...
22   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
23   source[99] = '\0'; 
24   memmove(data, source, 
       100*sizeof(char));
25   data[99] = '\0';
26   printLine(data);
27 }
Step 2: generating program slices w.r.t. 
SyVCs; example is for SyVC “data” (line 25)
Data dependency
Control dependency
i Statement  i
Statement containing 
the SyVC “data”
26
data
1
3
line
4
line
source
source
11
22
23
24
25
source
data
dataBuffer
13
14
18
data
data
9
data
16
dataBuffer
10
dataBuffer
19
func()
printLine()
7
26
data
1
data
3
line
4
line
source
source
11
22
23
24
25
source
data
dataBuffer
13
14
18
data
data
9
data
16
dataBuffer
10
dataBuffer
7
Backward slice
Forward slice
Fig. 3. Elaborating the SyVC→SeVC transformation in Algorithm 2 for SyVC “data”, where solid arrows (i.e., directed edges) represent
data dependency, and dashed arrows represent control dependency.
Algorithm 2 Transforming SyVCs to SeVCs
Input: A program P = {f1, . . . , fη}; a set Y = {ei,j,z} of SyVCs
generated by Algorithm 1
Output: The set of SeVCs
1: C ← ∅;
2: for each fi ∈ P do
3: Generate a PDG G′i = (Vi, E
′
i) for fi;
4: end for
5: for each ei,j,z ∈ Y in G′i do
6: Generate forward slice fsi,j,z & backward slice bsi,j,z of ei,j,z ;
7: Generate interprocedural forward slice fs′i,j,z by interconnecting
fsi,j,z and the forward slices from the functions called by fi;
8: Generate interprocedural backward slice bs′i,j,z by interconnecting
bsi,j,z and the backward slices from both the functions called by
fi and the functions calling fi;
9: psi,j,z ← fs′i,j,z∪bs′i,j,z ; {throughout this algorithm, “set ∪” means
ordered set union; see text for explanations}
10: for each statement si,j ∈ fi appearing in psi,j,z as a node do
11: δi,j,z ← δi,j,z ∪ {si,j}, according to the order of the appearance
of si,j in fi;
12: end for
13: for two statements si,j ∈ fi and sap,bq ∈ fap (i 6= ap) appearing
in psi,j,z as nodes do
14: if fi calls fap then
15: δi,j,z ← δi,j,z ∪ {si,j , sap,bq}, where si,j < sap,bq ;
16: else
17: δi,j,z ← δi,j,z ∪ {si,j , sap,bq}, where si,j > sap,bq ;
18: end if
19: end for
20: C ← C ∪ {δi,j,z};
21: end for
22: return C; {the set of SeVCs}
As a running example, the third column in Fig. 3 shows
the program slice of SyVC “data”, where the backward
slice corresponds to function func and the forward slice
corresponds to functions func and printLine. It is worth
mentioning that for obtaining the forward slice of a SyVC, we
leverage only data dependency for two reasons: (i) statements
affected by a SyVC via control dependency would not be
vulnerable in most cases and (ii) utilizing statements that
have a control dependency on a SyVC would involve many
statements that have little to do with vulnerabilities. On the
other hand, for obtaining the backward slice of a SyVC, we
leverage both data dependency and control dependency.
Step 3 (lines 10-19 in Algorithm 2). This step transforms
program slices to SeVCs as follows. First, the algorithm trans-
forms the statements belonging to function fi and appearing
in psi,j,z as nodes to a SeVC, while preserving the order of
these statements in fi. As a running example shown in Fig.
3, 13 statements belong to function func, and 3 statements
belong to function printLine. According to the order of these
statements in the two functions, we obtain two ordered sets of
statements: lines {7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26} and lines {1, 3, 4}.
Second, the algorithm transforms the statements belonging
to different functions to a SeVC. For statements si,j ∈ fi
and sap,bq ∈ fap (i 6= ap) appearing in psi,j,z as nodes, if
fi calls fap , then si,j and sap,bq are in the same order of
function call, that is, si,j < sap,bq ; otherwise, si,j > sap,bq .
As a running example shown in Fig. 3, the SeVC is {7, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 1, 3, 4}, in which the
statements in function func appear before the statements in
function printLine because func calls printLine. The fourth
column in Fig. 3 shows the SeVC corresponding to SyVC
“data”, namely an order set of statements that are semantically
related to SyVC “data”.
3) Encoding SeVCs into Vectors: Algorithm 3 encodes
SeVCs into vectors in three steps.
Step 1 (lines 2-6 in Algorithm 3). Each SeVC δi,j,z is
transformed to a symbolic representation. For this purpose, we
propose removing non-ASCII characters and comments, then
map variable names to symbolic names (e.g., “V1”, “V2”)
in a one-to-one fashion, and finally map function names to
symbolic names (e.g., “F1”, “F2”) in a one-to-one fashion.
Note that different SeVCs may have the same symbolic
representation.
Step 2 (lines 8-13 in Algorithm 3). This step is to encode
the symbolic representations into vectors. For this purpose,
we propose dividing the symbolic representation of a SeVC
δi,j,z (e.g., “V1=V2-8;”) into a sequence of symbols via a
lexical analysis (e.g., “V1”, “=”, “V2”, “-”, “8”, and “;”). We
transform a symbol to a fixed-length vector. By concatenating
the vectors, we obtain a vector Ri,j,z for each SeVC.
Step 3 (lines 14-22 in Algorithm 3). Because (i) the number
of symbols (i.e., the vectors representing SeVCs) may be
6Algorithm 3 Transforming SeVCs to vectors
Input: A set C of SeVCs generated by Algorithm 2;
a threshold θ
Output: The set of vectors corresponding to SeVCs
1: R← ∅;
2: for each δi,j,z ∈ C do
3: Remove non-ASCII characters in δi,j,z ;
4: Map variable names in δi,j,z to symbolic names;
5: Map function names in δi,j,z to symbolic names;
6: end for
7: for each δi,j,z ∈ C do
8: Ri,j,z ← ∅;
9: Divide δi,j,z into a set of symbols S;
10: for each α ∈ S in order do
11: Transform α to a fixed-length vector v(α);
12: Ri,j,z ← Ri,j,z ||v(α), where || means concatenation;
13: end for
14: if Ri,j,z is shorter than θ then
15: Zeroes are padded to the end of Ri,j,z ;
16: else if the vector corresponding to fsi,j is shorter than θ/2 then
17: Delete the leftmost portion of Ri,j,z to make |Ri,j,z | = θ;
18: else if the vector corresponding to bsi,j is shorter than θ/2 then
19: Delete the rightmost portion of Ri,j,z to make |Ri,j,z | = θ;
20: else
21: Delete almost the same length from the leftmost portion and the
rightmost portion of Ri,j,z to make |Ri,j,z | = θ;
22: end if
23: R← R ∪Ri,j,z ;
24: end for
25: return R; {the set of vectors corresponding to SeVCs}
different and (ii) neural networks take vectors of the same
length as input, we use a threshold θ as the length of vectors
for the input to neural network. When a vector is shorter
than θ, zeroes are padded to the end of the vector. When a
vector is longer than θ, we consider three scenarios. (i) If
the portion of the vector corresponding to the forward slice
fsi,j is shorter than θ/2, we delete the leftmost portion of
Ri,j,z to make |Ri,j,z| = θ. (ii) If the portion of the vector
corresponding to the backward slice bsi,j is shorter than θ/2,
we delete the rightmost portion of Ri,j,z to make |Ri,j,z| = θ.
(iii) Otherwise, we delete almost the same length from the
leftmost portion and the rightmost portion of Ri,j,z to make
|Ri,j,z| = θ.
4) Labeling SeVCs and Corresponding Vectors: In order
to learn a deep neural network, we label the vectors (i.e.,
the SeVCs they represent) as vulnerable or not as follows:
A SeVC (i.e., the vector representing it) containing a known
vulnerability is labeled as “1” (i.e., vulnerable), and “0”
otherwise (i.e., not vulnerable). A learned deep neural network
encodes vulnerability patterns and can detect whether given
SeVCs are vulnerable or not.
C. Evaluation Metrics
The effectiveness of vulnerability detectors can be evaluated
by the following 5 widely-used metrics [27]: false-positive rate
(FPR), false-negative rate (FNR), accuracy (A), precision
(P ), and F1-measure (F1). Let TP denote the number of
vulnerable samples that are detected as vulnerable, FP denote
the number of samples are not vulnerable but are detected
as vulnerable, TN denote the number of samples that are not
vulnerable and are detected as not vulnerable, and FN denote
the number of vulnerable samples that are detected as not
vulnerable. Table I summarizes their definitions.
TABLE I
EVALUATION METRICS.
Metric Formula Meaning
False-
positive
rate
FPR = FP
FP+TN
The proportion of false-positive
samples in the total samples that
are not vulnerable.
False-
negative
rate
FNR = FN
TP+FN
The proportion of false-negative
samples in the total samples that
are vulnerable.
Accuracy A = TP+TN
TP+FP+TN+FN
The correctness of all detected
samples.
Precision P = TP
TP+FP
The correctness of detected vulner-
able samples.
F1-
measure F1 =
2·P ·(1−FNR)
P+(1−FNR)
The overall effectiveness consid-
ering both precision and false-
negative rate.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Research Questions and Dataset
Research questions. Our experiments are geared towards
answering the following Research Questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Can SySeVR make BLSTM detect multiple kinds
(vs. single kind) of vulnerabilities?
• RQ2: Can SySeVR make multiple kinds of deep neural
networks to detect multiple kinds of vulnerabilities? Can
we explain their (in)effectiveness?
• RQ3: Can accommodating control-dependency make Sy-
SeVR more effective, and by how much?
• RQ4: How more effective are SySeVR-based methods
when compared with the state-of-the-art methods?
In order to answer these questions, we implement the fol-
lowing 6 deep neural networks in Python using Theano [28]:
CNN [29], DBN [30], and RNNs (including LSTM, GRU,
BLSTM, and BGRU [31], [32], [33]). The computer running
experiments has a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU and an
Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU running at 3.50GHz.
Vulnerability dataset. We produce a vulnerability dataset
from two sources: NVD [21] and SARD [22]. NVD contains
vulnerabilities in production software and possibly diff files
describing the difference between a vulnerable piece of code
and its patched version. SARD contains production, synthetic
and academic programs (also known as test cases), which
are categorized as “good” (i.e., having no vulnerabilities),
“bad” (i.e., having vulnerabilities), and “mixed” (i.e., having
vulnerabilities whose patched versions are also available).
For NVD, we focus on 19 popular C/C++ open source
products (same as in [11]) and their vulnerabilities that are
accompanied by diff files, which are needed for extracting
vulnerable pieces of code. As a result, we collect 1,592 open
source C/C++ programs, of which 874 are vulnerable. For
SARD, we collect 14,000 C/C++ programs, of which 13,906
programs are vulnerable (i.e., “bad” or “mixed”). In total,
we collect 15,592 programs, of which 14,780 are vulnerable;
these vulnerable programs contain 126 types of vulnerabilities,
where each type is uniquely identified by a Common Weakness
Enumeration IDentifier (CWE ID) [34]. The 126 CWE IDs are
published with our dataset.
B. Experiments
The experiments follow the SySeVR framework, with elab-
orations when necessary.
71) Extracting SyVCs: In what follows we will elaborate the
two components in Algorithm 1 that are specific to different
kinds of vulnerabilities: the extraction of vulnerability syntax
characteristics and how to match them.
Extracting vulnerability syntax characteristics. In order to
extract syntax characteristics of known vulnerabilities, it would
be natural to extract the vulnerable lines of code from the vul-
nerable programs mentioned above, and analyze their syntax
characteristics. However, this is an extremely time-consuming
task, which prompts us to leverage the C/C++ vulnerability
rules of a state-of-the-art commercial tool, Checkmarx [6], to
analyze vulnerability syntax characteristics. As we will see,
this alternate method is effective because it covers 93.6% of
the vulnerable programs collected from SARD. It is worth
mentioning that we choose Checkmarx over open-source tools
(e.g., Flawfinder [4] and RATS [5]) because the latter have
simple parsers and imperfect rules [35].
Our manual examination of Checkmarx rules leads to the
following 4 syntax characteristics (each accommodating many
vulnerabilities).
• Library/API Function Call (FC for short): This syn-
tax characteristic covers 811 library/API function calls,
which are published with our dataset. These 811 function
calls correspond to 106 CWE IDs.
• Array Usage (AU for short): This syntax characteristic
covers 87 CWE IDs related to arrays (e.g., issues related
to array element access, array address arithmetic).
• Pointer Usage (PU for short): This syntax characteristic
covers 103 CWE IDs related to pointers (e.g., improper
use in pointer arithmetic, reference, address transfer as a
function parameter).
• Arithmetic Expression (AE for short): This syntax charac-
teristic covers 45 CWE IDs related to improper arithmetic
expressions (e.g., integer overflow).
Fig. 4 shows that these 4 syntax characteristics overlap with
each other in terms of the CWE IDs they cover (e.g., 39 CWE
IDs exhibit all of the 4 syntax characteristics, but |FC∪AU∪
PU ∪ AE| = 126).
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Fig. 4. Venn diagram of the FC, AU, PU, and AE in terms of the
CWE IDs they cover, where |FC| = 106, |AU| = 87, |PU| = 103,
and |AE| = 45.
Matching syntax characteristics. In order to use Algorithm
1 to extract SyVCs, we need to determine whether or not
a code element ei,j,z , which is on the abstract syntax tree
Ti of function fi in program P , matches a vulnerability
syntax characteristic. Note that Ti can be generated by using
Joern [36]. The following method, as illustrated in Fig. 5
via the example program shown in Fig. 2, can automatically
decide whether or not code element ei,j,z matches a syntax
characteristic.
func
char *data data[99]='\0'
char * data =
data[99] '\0'
data 99
...IdentifierDeclStatement
Identifier
Identifier
func
char source[100] source[99]='\0'
char[100] source =
source[99] '\0'
source 99
IdentifierDeclStatement
Identifier ...
100
Identifier
func
...
memset(dataBuffer,...)
memset
Callee
memset
Identifier
...
data=dataBuffer-8
...
=
-
8dataBuffer
Identifier
data
Identifier
(a) FC syntax characteristic
(c) PU syntax characteristic
(b) AU syntax characteristic
(d) AE syntax characteristic
ExpressionStatement
...
Fig. 5. Examples for illustrating the matching of syntax character-
istics, where a highlighted node matches some vulnerability syntax
characteristic and therefore is a SyVC.
• As illustrated in Fig. 5(a), we say code element ei,j,z
(i.e., “memset”) matches the FC syntax characteristic if
(i) ei,j,z on Ti is a “callee” (i.e., the function is called),
and (ii) ei,j,z is one of the 811 function calls mentioned
above.
• As illustrated in Fig. 5(b), we say code element ei,j,z
(i.e., “source”) matches the AU syntax characteristic if (i)
ei,j,z is an identifier declared in an identifier declaration
statement (i.e., IdentifierDeclStatement) node and (ii) the
IdentifierDeclStatement node contains characters ‘[’ and
‘]’.
• As illustrated in Fig. 5(c), we say code element ei,j,z (i.e.,
“data”) matches the PU syntax characteristic if (i) ei,j,z
is an identifier declared in an IdentifierDeclStatement
node and (ii) the IdentifierDeclStatement node contains
character ‘∗’.
• As illustrated in Fig. 5(d), we say code element ei,j,z
(“data=dataBuffer-8”) matches the AE syntax character-
istic if (i) ei,j,z is an expression statement (Expression-
Statement) node and (ii) ei,j,z contains a character ‘=’
and has one or more identifers on the right-hand side of
‘=’.
Extracting SyVCs. Now we can use Algorithm 1 to extract
SyVCs from the 15,592 programs. Corresponding to the 4
syntax characteristics, we extract 4 kinds of SyVCs:
• FC-kind SyVCs: We extract 6,304 from NVD and 58,099
from SARD, or 64,403 in total.
• AU-kind SyVCs: We extract 9,776 from NVD and 32,453
from SARD, or 42,229 in total.
• PU-kind SyVCs: We extract 73,856 from NVD and
217,985 from SARD, or 291,841 in total.
• AE-kind SyVCs: We extract 5,264 from NVD and 16,890
from SARD, or 22,154 in total.
Putting them together, we extract 420,627 SyVCs, which cover
13,016 (out of the 13,906, or 93.6%) vulnerable programs
collected from SARD; this coverage validates our idea of using
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Note that we can compute the coverage 93.6% because SARD
gives the precise location of each vulnerability; in contrast, we
cannot compute the coverage with respect to NVD because it
does not give precise locations of vulnerabilities. The average
time for extracting a SyVC is 270 milliseconds.
2) Transforming SyVCs to SeVCs: When using Algorithm
2 to transform SyVCs to SeVCs, we use Joern [36] to extract
PDGs. Corresponding to the 420,627 SyVCs extracted from
Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 generates 420,627 SeVCs (while
recalling that one SyVC is transformed to one SeVC). In
order to see the effect of semantic information, we actually
use Algorithm 2 to generate two sets of SeVCs: one set
accommodating semantic information induced by data de-
pendency only, and the other set accommodating semantic
information induced by both data dependency and control
dependency. In either case, the second column of Table II
summarizes the numbers of SeVCs categorized by the kinds
of SyVCs from which they are transformed. In terms of the
efficiency of the SyVC→SeVC transformation, on average it
takes 331 milliseconds to generate a SeVC accommodating
data dependency and 362 milliseconds to generate a SeVC
accommodating data dependency and control dependency.
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF SEVCS, VULNERABLE SEVCS, AND NOT
VULNERABLE SEVCS FROM THE 15,592 PROGRAMS.
Kind of SyVCs #SeVCs #Vul. SeVCs #Not vul. SeVCs
FC-kind 64,403 13,603 50,800
AU-kind 42,229 10,926 31,303
PU-kind 291,841 28,391 263,450
AE-kind 22,154 3,475 18,679
Total 420,627 56,395 364,232
3) Encoding SeVCs into Vector Representation: We use
Algorithm 3 to encode SeVCs into vector representation. For
this purpose, we adopt word2vec [37] to encode the symbols
of each SeVC into fixed-length vectors. Then, each SeVC is
represented by the concatenation of the vectors representing
its symbols. We set each SeVC to have 500 symbols (padding
or truncating if necessary, as discussed in Algorithm 3) and
the length of each symbol is 30, meaning θ = 15, 000.
4) Generating Ground Truth Labels of SeVCs: For SeVCs
extracted from NVD, we examine the vulnerabilities whose
diff files involve line deletion; we do not consider the
diff files that only involve line additions because in these
cases the vulnerable statements are not given by NVD. We
generate the ground truth labels in 3 steps. Step 1: Parse
a diff file to mark the lines that are prefixed with a “-”
and are deleted/modified, and the lines that are prefixed with
a “-” and are moved (i.e., deleted at one place and added
at another place). Step 2: If a SeVC contains at least one
deleted/modified statement that is prefixed with a “-”, it is
labeled as “1” (i.e., vulnerable); if a SeVC contains at least
one moved statement prefixed with a “-” and the detected file
contains a known vulnerability, it is labeled as “1”; otherwise,
a SeVC is labeled as “0” (i.e., not vulnerable). Step 3: Check
the SeVCs that are labeled as “1” because Step 2 may mislabel
some SeVCs that are not vulnerable as “1” (while noting that it
is not possible to mislabel a vulnerable SeVC as “0”). Among
the preceding 3 steps, the first two are automated, but the last
one is manual.
For SeVCs extracted from SARD, a SeVC extracted from
a “good” program is labeled as “0”; a SeVC extracted from
a “bad” or “mixed” program is labeled as “1” if the SeVC
contains at least one vulnerable statement, and “0” otherwise.
In total, 56,395 SeVCs are labeled as “1” and 364,232
SeVCs are labeled as “0”. The third and fourth columns
of Table II summarize the number of vulnerable vs. not
vulnerable SeVCs corresponding to each kind of SyVCs. The
ground-truth label of the vector corresponding to a SeVC is
the same as the ground truth label of the SeVC.
C. Experimental Results
For learning a deep neural network, we use 80% of the
programs respectively and randomly selected from NVD and
SARD for training (training programs), and use the rest 20%
for testing (testing programs).
1) Experiments for Answering RQ1: In this experiment, we
use BLSTM as in [11] and the SeVCs accommodating seman-
tic information induced by data and control dependencies. We
randomly choose 30,000 SeVCs extracted from the training
programs as the training set (12.7% of which are vulnerable
and the rest 87.3% are not) and 7,500 SeVCs extracted from
the testing programs as the testing set (12.2% of which are
vulnerable and the rest 87.8% are not). Both sets contain
SeVCs corresponding to the 4 kinds of SyVCs, proportional to
their amount as shown in the second column of Table II. For
fair comparison with VulDeePecker [11], we also randomly
choose 30,000 SeVCs corresponding to the FC-kind SyVCs
extracted from the training programs (22.8% of which are
vulnerable and the rest 77.2% are not) as the training set,
and randomly choose 7,500 SeVCs corresponding to the FC-
kind SyVCs extracted from the testing programs as the testing
set (22.0% of which are vulnerable and the rest 78.0% are
not). These SeVCs only accommodate semantic information
induced by data dependency (as in [11]).
The main parameters for learning BLSTM are: dropout is
0.2; batch size is 16; number of epochs is 20; output dimension
is 256; minibatch stochastic gradient descent together with
ADAMAX [38] is used for training with a default learning
rate of 0.002; dimension of hidden vectors is 500; and number
of hidden layers is 2.
TABLE III
EFFECTIVENESS OF VULDEEPECKER [11] VS. EFFECTIVENESS OF
BLSTM IN THE SYSEVR FRAMEWORK.
Kind of SyVC FPR(%)
FNR
(%)
A
(%)
P
(%)
F1
(%)
VulDeePecker w/ FC-kind 4.1 21.7 92.0 84.0 81.0
SySeVR-BLSTM w/ FC-kind 3.8 9.6 94.9 87.3 88.8
SySeVR-BLSTM w/ AU-kind 6.3 11.7 92.4 82.5 85.3
SySeVR-BLSTM w/ PU-kind 2.1 13.6 96.9 80.2 83.2
SySeVR-BLSTM w/ AE-kind 1.5 12.5 97.3 87.5 87.5
SySeVR-BLSTM w/ all-kinds 2.9 12.1 95.9 82.5 85.2
Table III summarizes the results. We observe that SySeVR-
enabled BLSTM (or SySeVR-BLSTM) with FC-kind SyVCs
leads to the lowest FNR (9.6%), but its FPR is higher than that
of PU- and AE-kind SyVCs. The other 3 types of SyVCs lead
9to, on average, a FPR of 3.3% and a FNR of 12.6%. Overall,
SySeVR makes BLSTM achieve a lower FPR (0.3% lower)
and a lower FNR (12.1% lower) than VulDeePecker for the
same kind of vulnerabilities. This leads to:
Insight 1: SySeVR-BLSTM detects various kinds of vulner-
abilities, and can reduce FNR by 12.1%.
2) Experiments for Answering RQ2: In order to answer
RQ2, we train 1 CNN, 1 DBN, and 4 RNNs (i.e., LSTM, GRU,
BLSTM, and BGRU) using the same dataset as in Section
III-C1. Table IV summarizes the results. We observe that when
compared with unidirectional RNNs (i.e., LSTM and GRU),
bidirectional RNNs (i.e., BLSTM and BGRU) can reduce FNR
by 3.1% on average, at the price of increasing FPR by 0.3% on
average. This phenomenon might be caused by the following:
Bidirectional RNNs can accommodate more information about
the statements that appear before and after the statement in
question. In summary,
Insight 2: SySeVR-enabled bidirectional RNNs (especially
BGRU) are more effective than CNNs, which in turn are more
effective than DBNs. Still, their FNRs are consistently much
higher than their FPRs.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN 6 NEURAL NETWORKS.
Neural network FPR (%) FNR (%) A (%) P (%) F1 (%)
CNN 2.1 16.3 95.9 86.5 85.0
DBN 11.0 83.6 78.8 19.4 17.8
LSTM 2.5 15.9 95.7 83.7 83.9
GRU 2.5 14.7 95.9 84.9 85.1
BLSTM 2.9 12.1 95.9 82.5 85.2
BGRU 2.7 12.3 96.0 84.1 85.9
Towards explaining the effectiveness of BGRU in vulner-
ability detection. It is important, but an outstanding open
problem, to explain the effectiveness of deep neural networks.
Now we report our initial effort along this direction. In what
follows we focus on BGRU because it is more effective than
the others.
In order to explain the effectiveness of BGRU, we review
its structure in Fig. 6. For each SeVC and each time step,
there is an output (belonging to [0, 1]) at the activation layer.
The output of BGRU is the output of the last time step at the
activation layer; the closer this output is to 1, the more likely
the SeVC is classified as vulnerable. For the classification of
a SeVC, we identify the tokens (i.e., the symbols representing
them) that play a critical role in determining its classification.
This can be achieved by looking at all pairs of tokens at time
steps (t′, t′ + 1). We find that if the activation-layer output
corresponding to the token at time step t′ + 1 is substantially
(e.g., 0.6) greater (vs. smaller) than the activation-layer output
corresponding to the token at time step t′, then the token at
time step t′ + 1 plays a critical role in classifying the SeVC
as vulnerable (correspondingly, not vulnerable). Moreover, we
find that many false-negatives are caused by the token “if”
or the token(s) following it, because these tokens often appear
in SeVCs that are not vulnerable. We also find that many
false-positives are caused by the token(s) related to library/API
function calls and their arguments, because these tokens often
appear in SeVCs that are vulnerable. In summary, we have
Insight 3: The effectiveness of BGRU is substantially in-
fluenced by the training data. If some syntax elements often
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Fig. 6. The structure of BGRU.
appear in SeVCs that are vulnerable (vs. not vulnerable), then
these elements may cause false-positives (correspondingly,
false-negatives).
Using tailored or universal vulnerability detectors? In
practice, we often deal with multiple kinds of vulnerabilities
(or SyVCs). This raises a new question: should we use
multiple neural networks (one for each kind of SyVCs) or a
single neural network (accommodating 4 kinds of SyVCs) to
detect vulnerabilities? In order to answer this question, we
conduct the following experiment. For FC-, AU- and PU-
kind SyVCs, we randomly choose 30,000 SeVCs extracted
from the training programs as the training set and 7,500
SeVCs extracted from the testing programs as the testing set,
where the SeVCs accommodate semantic information induced
by data dependency and control dependency. For the much
fewer AE-kind vulnerabilities, we use all of the 20,336 SeVCs
extracted from the training programs for training (15.9% of
which are vulnerable and the rest 84.1% are not), and all of the
1,818 SeVCs extracted from the testing programs for testing
(12.0% of which are vulnerable and the rest 88.0% are not).
TABLE V
EFFECTIVENESS OF TAILORED VS. UNIVERSAL BGRU.
Kind of SyVC FPR (%) FNR (%) A (%) P (%) F1 (%)
FC-kind 3.1 7.6 95.9 89.5 90.9
AU-kind 3.0 10.2 95.2 90.6 90.2
PU-kind 1.7 22.7 96.2 83.2 80.1
AE-kind 1.4 3.8 98.2 93.7 94.9
All-kinds 2.7 12.3 96.0 84.1 85.9
Table V summarizes the experimental results. We observe
that using BGRU specific to each kind of SyVCs is more
effective, except for PU, than using a single BGRU to detect
vulnerabilities related to 4 kinds of SyVCs. This does not
hold for PU likely because as shown in Table II, the ratio
of vulnerable vs. not vulnerable SeVCs in PU-kind of SyVCs
is 1:9, which is much smaller than the average ratio of 1:4 in
the other 3 kinds of SyVCs. As a consequence, the resulting
BGRU would be biased for SeVCs that are not vulnerable,
leading to a high FNR. In summary,
Insight 4: It is better to use BGRU tailored to specific kind
of vulnerabilities than to use a single BGRU for detecting
multiple kinds of vulnerabilities.
3) Experiments for Answering RQ3: We use experiment to
compare the effectiveness of (i) the 6 neural networks learned
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from the SeVCs that accommodate semantic information in-
duced by data dependency and (ii) the 6 neural networks
learned from the SeVCs that accommodate semantic infor-
mation induced by data dependency and control dependency.
In either case, we randomly choose 30,000 SeVCs extracted
from the training programs as the training set and 7,500 SeVCs
extracted from the testing programs as the testing set. All of
these training and testing sets correspond to the 4 kinds of
SyVCs, proportional to their amount as shown in the second
column of Table II.
TABLE VI
EFFECTIVENESS OF SEMANTIC INFORMATION INDUCED BY DATA
DEPENDENCY (“DD” FOR SHORT) VS. SEMANTIC INFORMATION
INDUCED BY DATA DEPENDENCY AND CONTROL DEPENDENCY
(“DDCD” FOR SHORT).
Neural
network
Kind of
SeVC
FPR
(%)
FNR
(%)
A
(%)
P
(%)
F1
(%)
CNN DD 1.8 38.8 93.2 83.8 70.7DDCD 2.1 16.3 95.9 86.5 85.0
DBN DD 10.9 86.3 79.0 16.3 14.9DDCD 11.0 83.6 78.8 19.4 17.8
LSTM DD 5.3 39.6 90.2 64.0 62.2DDCD 2.5 15.9 95.7 83.7 83.9
GRU DD 2.5 37.4 92.8 79.2 69.9DDCD 2.5 14.7 95.9 84.9 85.1
BLSTM DD 2.9 38.5 92.3 76.7 68.3DDCD 2.9 12.1 95.9 82.5 85.2
BGRU DD 3.1 31.9 93.0 77.2 72.3DDCD 2.7 12.3 96.0 84.1 85.9
Table VI summarizes the results. We observe that accommo-
dating semantic information induced by data dependency and
control dependency can improve the vulnerability detection
capability in almost every scenario, and reduce the FNR by
19.6% on average. This can be explained by the fact that
control dependency accommodates extra information useful to
vulnerability detection.
Insight 5: The more semantic information is accommodated
for learning neural networks, the higher vulnerability detec-
tion capability of the learned neural networks.
4) Experiments for Answering RQ4: We consider BGRU
learned from the 341,536 SeVCs corresponding to the 4 kinds
of SyVCs extracted from the training programs and the 79,091
SeVCs extracted from the testing programs, while accommo-
dating semantic information induced by data dependency and
control dependency. We compare our most effective model
BGRU with the commercial static vulnerability detection
tool Checkmarx [6] and open-source static analysis tools
Flawfinder [4] and RATS [5], because (i) these tools arguably
represent the state-of-the-art static analysis for vulnerability
detection; (ii) they are widely used for detecting vulnerabilities
in C/C++ source code; (iii) they directly operate on the source
code (i.e., no need to compile the source code); and (iv)
they are available to us. We also consider the state-of-the-
art system VUDDY [2], which is particularly suitable for
detecting vulnerabilities incurred by code cloning. We further
consider VulDeePecker [11], and we consider all 4 kinds of
SyVCs and data as well as control dependency for SySeVR.
Table VII summarizes the experimental results. We observe
that SySeVR-enabled BGRU substantially outperforms the
state-of-the-art vulnerability detection methods. The open-
source Flawfinder and RATS have high FPRs and FNRs.
TABLE VII
COMPARING BGRU IN THE SYSEVR FRAMEWORK AND
STATE-OF-THE-ART VULNERABILITY DETECTORS.
Method FPR (%) FNR (%) A (%) P (%) F1 (%)
Flawfinder 21.6 70.4 69.8 22.8 25.7
RATS 21.5 85.3 67.2 12.8 13.7
Checkmarx 20.8 56.8 72.9 30.9 36.1
VUDDY 4.3 90.1 71.2 47.7 16.4
VulDeePecker 2.5 41.8 92.2 78.0 66.6
SySeVR-BGRU 1.4 5.6 98.0 90.8 92.6
Checkmarx is better than Flawfinder and RATS, but still has
high FPRs and FNRs. VUDDY is known to trade a high FNR
for a low FPR, because it can only detect vulnerabilities that
are nearly identical to the vulnerabilities in the training pro-
grams. SySeVR-enabled BGRU is much more effective than
VulDeePecker because VulDeePecker cannot cope with other
kinds of SyVCs (than FC) and cannot accommodate semantic
information induced by control dependency. Moreover, BGRU
learned from a larger training set (i.e., 341,536 SeVCs) is
more effective than BGRU learned from a smaller training
set (30,000 SeVCs; see Table IV), by reducing 6.7% in FNR.
In summary,
Insight 6: SySeVR-enabled BGRU is much more effective
than the state-of-the-art vulnerability detection methods.
5) Applying BGRU to Detect Vulnerabilities in Software
Products: In order to show the usefulness of SySeVR in
detecting software vulnerabilities in real-world software prod-
ucts, we apply SySeVR-enabled BGRU to detect vulnerabili-
ties in 4 products: Libav, Seamonkey, Thunderbird, and Xen.
Each of these products contains multiple targets programs,
from which we extract their SyVCs, SeVCs, and vectors.
For each product, we apply SySeVR-enabled BGRU to its
20 versions so that we can tell whether some vulnerabilities
have been “silently” patched by the vendors when releasing a
newer version.
As highlighted in Table VIII, we detect 15 vulnerabilities
that are not reported in NVD. Among them, 7 are unknown
(i.e., their presence in these products are not known until now)
and are indeed similar (upon our manual examination) to the
CVE IDentifiers (CVE IDs) mentioned in Table VIII. We do
not give the full details of these vulnerabilities for ethical
considerations, but we have reported these 7 vulnerabilities to
the vendors. The other 8 vulnerabilities have been “silently”
patched by the vendors when releasing newer versions of the
products in question.
IV. LIMITATIONS
The present study has several limitations. First, we focus
on detecting vulnerabilities in C/C++ program source code,
meaning that the framework may need to be adapted to
cope with other programming languages and/or executables.
Second, our experiments cover 4 kinds of SyVCs; future
research needs to accommodate more kinds of SyVCs. Third,
the algorithms for generating SyVCs and SeVCs could be im-
proved to accommodate more syntactic/semantic information
for vulnerability detection. Fourth, we detect vulnerabilities
at the SeVC granularity (i.e., multiple lines of code that are
semantically related to each other), which could be improved
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TABLE VIII
THE 15 VULNERABILITIES, WHICH ARE DETECTED BY BGRU BUT NOT REPORTED IN THE NVD, INCLUDE 7 UNKNOWN
VULNERABILITIES AND 8 VULNERABILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN “SILENTLY” PATCHED.
Target product CVE ID Vulnerableproduct reported
Vulnerability
release date
Vulnerable file in
the target product
Kind
of SyVC
1st patched version
of target product
Libav 10.3
CVE-2013-**** Ffmpeg **/**/2013 libavcodec/**.c AU-kind –
CVE-2013-7020 Ffmpeg 12/09/2013 libavcodec/ffv1dec.c PU-kind Libav 10.4
CVE-2013-**** Ffmpeg **/**/2013 libavcodec/**.c PU-kind –
CVE-2014-**** Ffmpeg **/**/2015 libavcodec/**.c PU-kind –
CVE-2014-**** Ffmpeg **/**/2014 libavcodec/**.c PU-kind –
Libav 9.10 CVE-2014-9676 Ffmpeg 02/27/2015 libavformat/segment.c PU-kind Libav 10.0
Seamonkey 2.32 CVE-2015-4511 Firefox 09/24/2015 .../src/nestegg.c AU-kind Seamonkey 2.38
Seamonkey 2.35 CVE-2015-**** Firefox **/**/2015 .../gonk/**.cpp FC-kind –
Thunderbird 38.0.1 CVE-2015-4511 Firefox 09/24/2015 .../src/nestegg.c AU-kind Thunderbird 43.0b1CVE-2015-**** Firefox **/**/2015 .../gonk/**.cpp FC-kind –
Xen 4.4.2
CVE-2013-4149 Qemu 11/04/2014 .../net/virtio-net.c PU-kind Xen 4.4.3
CVE-2015-1779 Qemu 01/12/2016 ui/vnc-ws.c PU-kind Xen 4.5.5
CVE-2015-3456 Qemu 05/13/2015 .../block/fdc.c PU-kind Xen 4.5.1
Xen 4.7.4 CVE-2016-4453 Qemu 06/01/2016 .../display/vmware vga.c AE-kind Xen 4.8.0
Xen 4.8.2 CVE-2016-**** Qemu **/**/2016 .../net/**.c PU-kind –
TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF METHODS FOR DETECTING VARIOUS KINDS OF VULNERABILITIES.
Method Degree ofautomation
Vulnerability
cause
Kind of SyVC
Model Granularity Information usesFC-kind
AU-
kind
PU-
kind
AE-
kind
Code similarity-based
methods Semi-automatic
Code
cloning – – – – None
Fine/
coarse
Code
representation
Open source tools
(e.g., Flawfinder, RATS) Manual Any
√ √ √ √
None Fine Lexical information
Checkmarx Manual Any
√ √ √ √
None Fine Data-dependency
Feature-based
machine learning Semi-automatic Any – – – –
Machine
learning Coarse Code metrics
VulDeePecker More automatic Any
√ × × × BLSTM Fine Data-dependency
SySeVR (our work) More automatic Any
√ √ √ √ 6 deep neural
networks Fine
Data-dependency &
control-dependency
to more precisely pin down the line of code that contains a
vulnerability. Fifth, we truncate the vectors transformed from
SeVCs when they are longer than a threshold; future research
needs to investigate how to cope with varying length of vectors
without losing the information caused by the truncation. Sixth,
our experiments show some deep neural networks are more
effective than the state-of-the-art vulnerability detection meth-
ods. Although we have gained some insights into explaining
the “why” part, more investigations are needed to explain the
success of deep learning in this context and beyond [39].
V. RELATED WORK
Prior studies related to vulnerability detection. There
are two methods for source code-based static vulnerability
detection: code similarity-based vs. pattern-based. Since code
similarity-based detectors can only detect vulnerabilities in-
curred by code cloning and the present study is a pattern-based
method, we review prior studies in the latter method. Table IX
summarizes the comparison between SySeVR and previous
vulnerability detection methods, which are divided into three
categories based on their degree of automation. (i) Manual
methods: Vulnerability patterns are manually generated by
human experts (e.g., Flawfinder [4], RATS [5], Checkmarx
[6]). These tools often incur high false-positives and/or high
false-negatives [35], as also confirmed by our experiments
(Section III-C4). (ii) Semi-automatic methods: Human ex-
perts are needed to manually define features (e.g., imports
and function calls [8]; complexity, code churn, and developer
activity [40]; API symbols and subtrees [10]; and system calls
[7]) for traditional machine learning models, such as support
vector machine and k-nearest neighbor. Different vulnerabili-
ties are often described by different features (e.g., format string
vulnerabilities [41]; information leakage vulnerabilities [42];
missing check vulnerabilities [9]; and taint-style vulnerabilities
[43], [44]). This method often detects vulnerabilities at a
coarse granularity (e.g., program [7]; component [8]; file [40];
or function [10]), meaning that locations of vulnerabilities
cannot be pinned down. (iii) More automatic methods:
Human experts do not need to define features. Lin et al.
[15] presented a method for automatically learning high-level
representations of functions (i.e., coarse-grained and not able
to pin down locations of vulnerabilities). VulDeePecker [11] is
the first system showing the feasibility of using deep learning
to detect vulnerabilities while able to pin down locations of
vulnerabilities. SySeVR is the first systematic framework for
using deep learning to detect vulnerabilities.
Prior studies related to deep learning. Deep learning has
been used for program analysis. CNN has been used for
software defect prediction [17], malicious URLs, file paths
detection, and registry keys detection [45]; DBN has been
used for software defect prediction [19], [20]; RNN has been
used for vulnerability detection [11], [15], software traceability
[12], code clone detection [13], and recognizing functions in
binaries [14]. The present study offers the first framework for
using deep learning to detect vulnerabilities.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We presented the SySeVR framework for using deep learn-
ing to detect vulnerabilities. Based on a large dataset of
vulnerability we collected, we drew a number of insights,
including an explanation on the effectiveness of deep learning
in vulnerability detection. Moreover, we detected 15 vulnera-
bilities that were not reported in the NVD. Among these 15
vulnerabilities, 7 are unknown and have been reported to the
vendors, and the other 8 have been “silently” patched by the
vendors when releasing newer versions.
There are many interesting problems for future research. In
particular, it is important to address the limitations discussed
in Section IV.
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